Abstract. We convert Stern's information set decoding (ISD) algorithm to the ring Z/4Z equipped with the Lee metric. Moreover, we set up the general framework for a McEliece and a Niederreiter cryptosystem over this ring. The complexity of the ISD algorithm determines the minimum key size in these cryptosystems for a given security level. We show that using Lee metric codes can drastically decrease the key size, compared to Hamming metric codes. In the end we explain how our results can be generalized to other Galois rings Z/p s Z.
Introduction
The hardness of decoding random linear codes is at the heart of any code-based public key cryptosystem. Information set decoding (ISD) algorithms are the main method for decoding random linear codes in the Hamming metric, whenever the problem has only a few solutions. An ISD algorithm is given a corrupted codeword and recovers the message or equivalently finds the error vector. Such algorithms are often formulated via the parity check matrix, since it is enough to find a vector of a certain weight which has the same syndrome as the corrupted codeword -this problem is also referred to as the syndrome decoding problem. ISD algorithms over the binary are based on a decoding algorithm proposed by Prange [30] in 1962 and the main structure of any variant does not change much from the original: as a first step one chooses an information set, then Gaussian elimination brings the parity check matrix into a standard form and, assuming that the errors are outside of the information set, these row operations on the syndrome will recover the error vector, if the weight does not exceed the given error correction capacity.
ISD algorithms are of immense importance when proposing a code-based cryptosystem. The idea of using linear codes in public key cryptography was first formulated by Robert McEliece [25] , in 1978. In the McEliece cryptosystem the private key is the generator matrix of a linear code with an efficient decoding algorithm. The public key is a scrambled and disguised version of the generator matrix, such that the private key (and hence the decoding algorithm) is not reconstructable from the public key. The message is encrypted by encoding it with the generator matrix and adding a random error of prescribed Hamming weight. The owner of the private key can recover the message by inverting the disguising function and using the efficient decoding algorithm. On the other hand, if the secret code is hidden well enough, an adversary who wants to break the system encounters the decoding problem of a random linear code, since the public code looks random to him. The best the adversary can do is hence to use the best generic decoding algorithm for random linear codes, which currently are ISD algorithms. ISD algorithms hence do not break a code-based cryptosystem but they determine the choice of secure parameters.
One of the main drawbacks of classical code-based cryptosystems are the public key sizes. To reduce these key sizes, over the last years, many variants of code-based cryptosystems have been proposed that use codes in the rank-metric, instead of the Hamming metric. This raises the question if other metrics can be useful, as well. This is why we study codes in the Lee metric for code-based cryptography in this paper, and show that, for theoretical code parameters, the Lee metric can also lead to a substantial reduction of the public key size.
Codes for the Lee metric are defined over integer residue rings Z m := Z/mZ, for some integer m > 1. Therefore, we are going to use ring-linear codes, which are defined to be Z m -submodules of Z n m . We especially want to focus on the most preferred case of quaternary codes, which are defined over Z 4 , since this case has been studied the most in the coding theory literature. In general, ring-linear codes were first mentioned by Assmus and Mattson in [2] , for important results see [16, 7, 6, 33, 32, 31, 27] , for a more general overview see [15] . The idea of using ring-linear codes for cryptography (in a quite different setting) first came up in [35] .
We note that, although Z 4 -linear Lee codes can be represented over F 2 , there exists no representation that keeps both the weight and the linearity of the Z 4 -code over F 2 . Thus the known results over F 2 cannot be used for the Lee metric. This is why this paper presents the adaption of Stern's ISD algorithm over the binary [34] to Z 4 and a general form of the McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems over Z 4 . The complexity of the ISD algorithm then determines a minimum public key size for a given security level of these cryptosystems.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the theory of ringlinear codes, especially Lee codes, Stern's algorithm over the binary [34] and the notations and concepts involved in the algorithm. In Section 3 we present the adaption of Stern's ISD algorithm over the binary to Z 4 , including a complexity analysis. In Section 4 we cover the applications of the ISD algorithm over Z 4 to codebased cryptography by stating the general McEliece cryptosystem using quaternary codes and also the Niederreiter version. In this context we will also investigate the key size of such a cryptosystem using theoretical values for the secret quaternary code regarding 128 bit security against Stern's ISD algorithm over Z 4 , from Section 3. We will then conclude this paper in Section 6 and add some open questions and problems.
Preliminaries
In this section we introduce ring-linear coding theory, especially the Lee codes, as well as Stern's binary ISD algorithm [34] and the concepts and notations involved.
2.1. Ring-linear coding theory. In traditional finite field coding theory an [n, k] linear code C over F q is a linear subspace of F n q of dimension k. One can generalize this by taking a finite ring R instead of F q .
Let us assume for simplicity that R is commutative, but observe that the following stays true in the noncommutative case. Definition 1. Let k and n be positive integers and let R be a finite ring. C is called an R-linear code of length n of type h, if C is a submodule of R n , with | C |= h.
We will restrict to the most preferred case of Z m := Z/mZ, for some m ∈ N. In particular, we will formulate most of our results for m = 4, since this case has been studied the most. Codes over Z 4 are referred to as quaternary codes: Definition 2. We say that C is a quaternary linear code of length n, if C is an additive subgroup of (Z 4 ) n .
In traditional finite field coding theory we endow F n q with the Hamming metric to define the weight of a codeword wt H and the distance of codewords d H . In ringlinear coding theory over Z m we could either use the Hamming metric or the Lee metric. If we use the Lee metric the corresponding codes are referred to as Lee codes.
In what follows we will use the notion quaternary codes for Lee codes over Z 4 .
Definition 3. For x ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} we define the Lee weight to be wt L (x) = min{x, m − x}, similarly for x ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} n we define the Lee weight to be the sum of the Lee weights of its coordinates:
For x, y ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} n , the Lee distance is defined to be
There is a connection between traditional finite field coding theory and Z 4 -linear coding theory via the Gray map: Definition 4. The Gray map is an isometry between (Z 4 , wt L ) and (F 2 2 , wt H ) and is defined as follows:
The Gray map can be extended component-wise to
Note however, that the Gray map does not preserve linearity, i.e., that the image of a quaternary linear code is generally not linear over F 2 .
We introduce the following notation: For a vector v of length n, a matrix A with n columns and a code C of length n and a set I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} we denote by v I the projection of v to its coordinates indexed by I, and by A I the columns of A indexed by I. Analogously we define C I := {v I | v ∈ C}.
We will use the following definition of information set, since it fits perfectly in the context of ring-linear codes:
Definition 5. For a code C over F q of length n and dimension k, we call a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size k an information set if | C I |=| C |.
Similarly for quaternary codes we have what is sometimes referred to as the quaternary information set:
Definition 6. For a code C over Z 4 of length n and type 4 k 1 2 k 2 , we call a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size k 1 + k 2 an (quaternary) information set if | C I |=| C |.
The following proposition defines the quaternary systematic form of the generator matrix and the parity check matrix of a quaternary code.
Proposition 7 ([16]
). Let C be a quaternary linear code of length n and type 4 k 1 2 k 2 . Then C is permutation equivalent to a code having the (k 1 + k 2 ) × n generator matrix
where
, for some k 1 , k 2 ∈ N 0 . A parity check matrix of C is the corresponding permutation of the (n − k 1 ) × n matrix
If we have a generator matrix of the form (2.1), to get a unique encoding, the messages need to be of the form m = (m 1 , m 2 ), where
2 . This also explains why we say that the type of C is 4 k 1 2 k 2 . Encoding is done as follows:
Hence the codewords are of the form c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), where
For the syndrome of a codeword c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) we get
The syndromes s = (s 1 , 2s 2 ) are such that
and s 2 ∈ Z k 2 2 . For the Lee codes there is also an analogue of the Singleton bound.
Proposition 8 ([1]
). Let C be a linear Lee code over Z m of length n and type m k . Then the Singleton type bound states that the minimum Lee distance
Thus, for a quaternary linear code C of length n and type 4 k 1 2 k 2 the Singleton type bound is
To compute the amount of vectors in Z n 4 having Lee weight w, we have to sum over all choices of i entries having Lee weight 2, of course only until ⌊w/2⌋. For the rest of the n − i entries we are missing a Lee weight of w − 2i. We will achieve this with entries of Lee weight 1, where for each of the w − 2i entries, there are two choices: either 1 or 3. We will introduce the following notation for the amount of these vectors:
With the Gray isometry we have that the number of vectors in Z n 4 having Lee weight w is the same as the number of vectors in F 2n 2 having Hamming weight w, which is simply given by 2n w . Note, one can also check that
With this remark we can also state an analogue of the Gilbert-Varshamov bound for quaternary codes.
Proposition 9. Let C be a Lee code over Z 4 of length n and minimum distance d. Then we have the following bound
Note that also the rate has a definition which fits perfectly in the Lee metric setting:
Definition 10. Let C be a code over Z m of length n and type | C |= m k . We say that C has rate R = log m (C) n = k n . Thus, a quaternary linear code of length n and type 4 k 1 2 k 2 has rate
Information set decoding algorithms.
Many ISD algorithms and improvements have been suggested to Prange's simplest form of ISD (see for example [8, 10, 11, 13, 20, 22, 36] [3] and the latest improvement is by May and Ozerov [24] .
All of the above mentioned ISD algorithms were proposed over the binary field. However, with new variants of the McEliece cryptosystem proposed over general finite fields, some of the mentioned ISD algorithms have been generalized to F q : Coffey and Goodman [12] generalized Prange's algorithm to F q , in [29] Peters generalized the algorithms by Lee-Brickell and Stern. Niebuhr, Persichetti, Cayrel, Bulygin and Buchmann [28] generalized the algorithm of Finiasz-Sendrier with efficiency improvements by using partial knowledge of attackers to a general finite field. In [18] Interlando, Khathuria, Rohrer, Rosenthal and Weger generalized the ball-collision algorithm by Bernstein, Lange and Peters to F q . In [17] Hirose generalized the May-Ozerov algorithm to F q . And Meurer generalized the algorithm of Becker, Joux, May and Meurer in [26] .
The general idea of ISD algorithms is to guess an information set I ⊂ {1, . . . n} of size k and the right distribution of the error vector corresponding to this information set, such that we can recover the message from this information set. In the algorithms we consider the information set I will be chosen randomly in each outer loop of the algorithm. Nevertheless we want to note that there is a slightly smarter way to do so, see [9] , by reusing some elements of I in the next iteration and only adding missing elements. For simplicity, we will just use a random choice.
Once we have chosen an information set I, we need to guess the error vector having the assumed weight distribution. In the binary case this means we just have to guess the locations of the errors. In Stern's algorithm the error vector has weight 2v in the information set coordinates. The average complexity of ISD algorithms is given by the cost of one iteration times the average number of iterations needed, which is given by the inverted success probability. Note that the success probability is given by having chosen the correct weight distribution of the error vector. In Stern's setting this success probability is
There are many smart concepts to speed up the cost of one iteration, some of which will be explained in the following, together with their complexities:
(1) The concept of intermediate sums presented in [5] is important whenever one wants to compute something for all vectors in a certain space. Consider, for example, the setting where we are given a binary k × n matrix A and want to compute Ax T for all x ∈ F n 2 , of weight w. This would usually cost k times w − 1 additions and w multiplications, for each x ∈ F n 2 . But if we first compute Ax T , where x has weight one, this only outputs the corresponding column of A and has no costs. From there we can compute the sums of two columns of A, there are n 2 many of these sums and each one costs k additions. From there we can compute all sums of three columns of A, which are n 3 many. Using the sums of two columns, we only need to add one more column costing k additions. Proceeding in this way, until one reaches the weight w, to compute Ax T for all x ∈ F n 2 of weight w, costs k · (L(n, w) − n) bit operations, where
Note that the we need to take away the cost of the weight one vectors, since they are for free. (2) The next concept called early abort (also presented in [5] ) is important whenever a computation is done while checking the weight of the result. For example one wants to compute x + y, where x, y ∈ F n 2 , which usually costs n additions, but we only proceed in the algorithm only if wt H (x+y) = t. Hence we compute and check the weight simultaneously and if the weight of the partial solution exceeds t one does not need to continue. For the Hamming weight one expects a randomly chosen bit to have weight 1 with probability 1 2 , hence after 2t we should reach the wanted weight t, and after 2(t + 1) we should exceed the weight t. Hence on average we expect to compute only 2(t + 1) many bits of the solution, before we can abort. (3) The third concept is the idea of using collisions. Instead of going through all possible error vectors of weight 2v, fulfilling certain properties, we can split this process. For this we consider vectors of weight v in one set S, and vectors with disjoint weight v in another set T , such that two vectors in the intersection of S and T determine the final error vector. The exact definition of the two sets and the properties the vectors need to fulfill will become clearer when we describe the actual algorithm, but we can assume that we need to find x, y from some S ⊆ F n 2 and T ⊆ F n 2 , respectively, such that Ax T = By T + s T for some prescribed binary matrices A, B. Assuming that x, y are uniformly distributed, the average amount of collisions is given by
The assumption of a uniform distribution is commonly used, and justified e.g. in [5] and references therein.
In the following we explain Stern's algorithm over the binary field with respect to the Hamming distance. For this we are going to use the following notation. For S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size ℓ, we denote by F n 2 (S) the vectors living in F n 2 having support in S. The projection of x ∈ F n 2 (S) to F ℓ 2 is denoted by π S (x). On the other hand we denote by σ S (x) the canonical embedding of x ∈ F ℓ 2 to x ∈ F n 2 (S). We will use a formulation of Stern's algorithm, which matches the ball-collision formulation in [5] . The only difference between these two algorithms is the zerowindow of size ℓ in Stern's algorithm, where no error is allowed, whereas in the ball-collision algorithm, this window is split into Y 1 , Y 2 and q 1 , q 2 errors are allowed respectively. For concrete parameters it turns out that, in most of the cases, q 1 = q 2 = 0 is the most efficient choice and in a few cases q 1 = q 2 = 1 is more efficient. Since therefore only a small improvement on concrete parameters results, we will generalize Stern's algorithm to Z 4 in this paper. Nevertheless, using the ball-collision formulation allows us to use improvements and speed ups like intermediate sums.
The setting for the algorithm is as follows: We are given the parity check matrix
, the amount of errors we can correct t and the syndrome s ∈ F n 2 . We want to find a vector e ∈ F n 2 , such that wt H (e) = t and He T = s. We are going to use all the ideas mentioned above. The algorithm is formulated in Algorithm 1. Note that, without formulating it in detail, the concept of intermediate sums is used in lines 6 and 7, and the concept of early abort is used in line 10. The collision is used in lines 8 and 9, since it is the same a in both cases.
Let us illustrate the algorithm in the easiest situation, where the information set is I = {1, . . . , k} and the zero window is {k + 1, . . . , k + ℓ}. We get 
and A 2 ∈ F (n−k−ℓ)×k 2 .
5:
Compute U s = s 1 s 2 with s 1 ∈ F ℓ 2 and s 2 ∈ F n−k−ℓ 2 .
6:
Compute the set S consisting of all pairs (A 1 π I (e X ), e X ), where e X ∈ F n 2 (X)
for each (a, e Y ) ∈ T do 10: if wt H (A 2 π I (e X + e Y ) + s 2 ) = t − 2v: then
11:
Output: e = e X + e Y + σ J (A 2 π I (e X + e Y ) + s 2 ). where
. From this we get the conditions
The part e 1 is chosen to be π I (e X + e Y ) such that it has weight 2v, and with the collision we ensure that the first condition is satisfied. The part e 2 is chosen such that its support is disjoint from e 1 , it has the remaining weight t − 2p, and the second condition is satisfied, i.e., e 2 = A 2 (π I (e X + e Y )) + s 2 . Therefore
i.e., e = (e 1 , 0, e 2 ) fulfills He T = s and wt H (e) = t.
Theorem 11. The average number of bit operations Algorithm 1 needs, is
Proof.
(1) As a first step we need to find the systematic form of the permuted parity check matrix, and the corresponding syndrome form. As a broad estimate we use the complexity of computing U [H | s], which takes approximately (n − k) 2 (n + 1) bit operations. (2) To build the set S one has to compute A 1 π I (e X ) for all e X ∈ F n 2 (X) of weight v. Using intermediate sums this costs
(3) The set T is built similarly, since one has to compute
where the ℓ is added for adding s 1 to A 1 π I (e Y ). (4) In the next step we want to check for collisions between the set S and T .
The set S consists of all e X , where e X ∈ F n 2 (X) has weight v. Hence S is of size 
The success probability is given by having chosen the correct weight distribution of the error vector, i.e. in X the weight v, in Y the weight v, and in J the missing weight t − 2v:
Hence the overall cost of this algorithm is given as in the claim by c(n, k, t, v, m 1 , m 2 , ℓ) · s(n, k, t, v, m 1 , m 2 , ℓ) −1 .
Information Set Decoding over Z 4
In this section we adapt our previous formulation of Stern's algorithm for Z 4 -linear codes. We first formulate the algorithm and illustrate how and why it works. Thereafter we determine its complexity.
3.1. Stern's Algorithm over Z 4 . In this section we adapt Stern's ISD algorithm from F 2 to Z 4 .
Recall from Algorithm 1 that the first step of the algorithm is to bring the parity check matrix into a column permutation of the systematic form. Observe that the systematic form for parity check matrices over Z 4 is given by
. One could separate the parts of the matrix living in Z 4 and Z 2 and use this in the algorithm, but it turns out that the algorithm gets more complicated and slower with this separation, compared to just considering the whole matrix over Z 4 .
Therefore, we consider the following system of equations that we get from the systematic form of the parity check matrix H and the syndrome s, if the information set is I = {1, . . . , k 1 + k 2 } and the zero window is {k 1 + k 2 + 1, . . . , k 1 + k 2 + ℓ}:
. From this we get the conditions Ae 1 =s 1 , Be 1 + e 2 =s 2 , 2Ce 1 =2s 3 .
We will choose e 1 and e 2 having disjoint Lee weight 2v and t − 2v, respectively. In order to satisfy the first and the third condition, which only depend on e 1 , we will check for a collision in the algorithm. The second condition will be satisfied by the choice of e 2 . Thus, compared to the binary version we only get the extra conditions 2Ce 1 = 2s 3 on e 1 . The rest is analogous. In fact we choose e 1 = π I (e X + e Y ) and e 2 = s 2 − Be 1 = s 2 − Bπ I (e X + e Y ), where I is the quaternary information set, and X and Y are partitions of I. Therefore we get
The final algorithm is formulated in Algorithm 2. As in the binary case, we implicitly assume that we use intermediate sums in lines 6 and 7, early abort in line 10 and the collision formulation in lines 8 and 9.
Algorithm 2 Stern's Algorithm over Z 4
Input: The (n − k 1 ) × n parity check matrix H over Z 4 , the syndrome s ∈ Z n−k 1 4 and the positive integers v, m 1 , m 2 , ℓ ∈ Z, such that
Output: e ∈ Z n 4 with He T = s and wt L (e) = t. 1: Choose a quaternary information set I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size k 1 + k 2 . 2: Choose a set Z ⊂ {1, . . . , n} \ I, of size ℓ and define J = {1, . . . , n} \ (I ∪ Z). 
and s 3 ∈ Z k 2 2 .
6: Compute the following set
for (a, b, e Y ) ∈ T do 10: if wt L (s 2 − B(π I (e X + e Y ))) = t − 2v then
11:
Output: e = e X + e Y + σ J (s 2 − B(π I (e X + e Y ))) 12: Start over with Step 1 and a new selection of I.
Complexity analysis.
We now estimate the complexity of this algorithm. We assume that one addition or one multiplication over Z 4 costs 2 binary operations each. We remark here that if a lookup table for the multiplication and addition is used, the cost of one multiplication as well as the cost of one addition over Z 4 will be only one bit operation as well. All the following costs however, will be given in bit operations and not using a lookup table.
As in the binary case we first determine the success probability for having chosen the right error weight distribution. From (2.4) we know that the amount of vectors in Z n 4 having Lee weight w is equal to 2n w , hence we get that the success probability of having chosen the correct Lee weight distribution of v in k coordinates over all vectors of length n having Lee weight w is given by c(k, w)c(n, t)
Next we determine the complexities of the separate speed up concepts in the main part of the algorithm. , each addition costing 2k bit operations, as long as there are vectors having this Lee weight. Hence for
the cost of computing Ax T , for all x ∈ Z n 4 , of weight w is 2kL(n, w) bit operations. Observe that we do not take away the cost of the first step, over Z 4 , since the first step is no longer for free. ) −1 t = t additions and therefore calculate t + 1 entries, before we can abort the computation. (3) Collisions: The average amount of collisions one needs to check between elements living in Z n 4 of a set S and a set T , under the assumption of a uniform distribution (analogously to the binary case), is given by
Theorem 12. The average number of bit operations Algorithm 2 needs, is
(1) As a first step we need to find the (permuted) quaternary systematic form of the parity check matrix, and the corresponding syndrome form. As a broad estimate we use the complexity of computing U [H | s], which takes approximately (n − k 1 ) 2 (n + 1) quaternary operations, i.e., 2(n − k 1 ) 2 (n + 1) bit operations. (2) To build the set S one has to compute Aπ I (e X ) and 2Cπ I (e X ) for all e X ∈ Z n 4 (X) of weight v. Using intermediate sums the first entry costs 2ℓL(m 1 , v) and the second entry costs
Hence in total to compute S costs
(3) The set T is built similarly, since one has to compute s 1 − A(π I (e Y )) and 2s 3 − 2C(π I (e Y )) for all e Y ∈ Z n 4 (Y ) of weight v. Using intermediate sums the first entry costs 2ℓL(m 2 , v)+ 2ℓ and the second entry costs
(4) In the next step we want to check for the two collisions between the set S and T . The set S consists of all e X , where e X ∈ Z n 4 (X) has weight v. Hence S is of size
and similarly the set T is of size
v . The first collision lives in Z ℓ 4 , whereas the second collision lives in Z k 2 2 . We assume an uniform distribution and hence have to check on average
2 k 2 +2ℓ many collisions. For each collision we have to compute s 2 − B(π I (e X + e Y )). With the method of early abort we only have to compute this on average t − 2v + 1 times. Each entry of the solution costs 2v multiplications and 2v + 2 additions, hence 8v + 2 binary operations. (5) This sums up to the cost of one iteration being
2 k 2 +2ℓ (t − 2v + 1)(8v + 2). The success probability is given by having chosen the correct weight distribution of the error vector, i.e. in X the weight v, in Y the weight v, and in J the missing weight t − 2v:
Hence the overall cost of this algorithm is as in the claim given by
Applications: Code-based cryptosystems over Z 4
In this section we state a quaternary version of the McEliece and the Niederreiter cryptosystem. For the key generation one chooses a quaternary code C of length n and type h = 4 k 1 2 k 2 , which has an efficient decoding algorithm and is able to correct up to t errors. 4.1. Quaternary McEliece. Let G be a (k 1 + k 2 ) × n generator matrix of C and choose an n × n permutation matrix P , this matrix has no further conditions, since the change of columns does not affect the Z 2 -part of the message, whereas for the (k 1 + k 2 ) × (k 1 + k 2 ) invertible matrix S, we need further conditions: in the classical case over finite fields, S is just a change of basis, but in the Z 4 case, changing the rows of the generator matrix affects the position of Z 2 -part of the message. Since such a change hinders the constructor of the cryptosystem to tell where the Z 2 -part of the message should be taken, we will restrict the choice of invertible matrices to the following form: let S 1 and S 2 be k 1 × k 1 , respectively k 2 × k 2 invertible matrices over Z 4 , then S is given by
Compute G ′ = SGP and publish (k 1 , k 2 , G ′ , t). For the encryption, let x = (x 1 , x 2 ), with
2 be the message and choose an error vector e ∈ Z n 4 of Lee weight wt L (e) ≤ t. The cipher is computed as y = xG ′ + e.
For the decryption one computes
Since wt L (eP −1 ) ≤ t and SG generates the same code as G we can use the decoding algorithm of the code to recover xS and hence the message x.
4.2. Quaternary Niederreiter. The quaternary version of the Niederreiter cryptosystem is done in a similar way by using the parity check matrix H and by computing its syndromes for encryption. Since there is no restriction on the message space in the Niederreiter version, there will be no conditions needed on the permutation matrix and on the invertible matrix. Again, one chooses a quaternary code C of length n and type h = 4 k 1 2 k 2 , which has an efficient decoding algorithm and is able to correct up to t errors.
Let H be a (n − k 1 ) × n parity matrix of C, choose an invertible (n − k 1 ) × (n − k 1 ) matrix S, i.e. det(S) ∈ Z × 4 and an n × n permutation matrix P . Compute H ′ = S −1 HP T and publish (k 1 , k 2 , H ′ , t).
For the encryption, let x ∈ (Z 4 ) n be the message of Lee weight wt L (x) ≤ t. The cipher is computed as
Since wt L (P T x T ) ≤ t we can use the decoding algorithm of the code to recover P T x T and hence the message x.
Key Size.
To determine the key size we need to count the number of nonprescribed entries of the public generator matrix. For this we assume that the generator matrix is published in quaternary systematic form as in (2.1). Note that one could also publish a generator matrix whose size does not match the size of its systematic form in (2.1). For simplicity however, we assume that the sizes of the published matrices match the sizes of their systematic forms. This allows us to compute the size of the generator matrix in the form (2.1), or equivalently the size of the parity check matrix in the form (2.2). The size of the public key, given by the non-prescribed parts of either the generator or the parity check matrix, is
bits.
In the following we study the key sizes of the proposed cryptosystem in Section 4 with respect to a given security level against Algorithm 2 provided in Section 2.2.
Two of the most studied families of Z 4 -linear codes are Kerdock [19] and Preparata codes. Because of their small minimum distance Preparata codes are not useful for our cryptosystems. Even though Kerdock codes over Z 4 satisfy all the conditions needed for the quaternary version of the McEliece cryptosystem, they seem to be a bad choice for key size reasons: while the key size of the cryptosystems doubles going from code length n = 2 m to 2 m+1 , the security level only increases by 3 bits.
For now we leave it as an open problem to find suitable codes for the use in a Lee-metric public key cryptosystem. For the remainder of this paper we will use only theoretical parameters, to illustrate how using the Lee metric could potentially decrease the key sizes in a McEliece or Niederreiter type crpytosystem. We consider quaternary codes achieving the Gilbert-Varshamov bound in the Lee metric, i.e., codes of length n and Lee weight d whose cardinality are at least
Example 13. As a first example we examine codes of length n = 150 and minimum Lee distance d = 81. The Gilbert-Varshamov bound tells us that such codes with Z 4 -dimension 26 = k 1 + k 2 /2 exist. We now vary k 1 from 1 to 25, with k 2 = 2(26 − k 1 ). Furthermore, we set
With these parameters we get the following key sizes and security levels in bits: Example 14. Given the relative distance d/n = 0.2, we search for a minimal code length n, such that a k 1 exists with which the security level of 128 bits is reached. We get n = 425, k = 240, k 1 = 55, k 2 = 370, t = 42, and key size of 20335 bits.
Remark 15. All these theoretical values give much smaller public keys than the classical McEliece system with binary Goppa codes achieves. For this note that for the security level of 128 bits, the proposed parameters for the McEliece system using Goppa codes by Bernstein et al. in [4] are n = 2960, k = 2288, which gives a key size of 1537536 bits. In fact the theoretical key sizes presented here are within the range of quasi-cyclic MDPC codes, which were submitted to NIST for post-quantum code-based cryptosystem (from 10 to 37 kilobits).
Generalization from Z 4 to Z p s
In this section we give the general ideas how to generalize the ISD algorithm and the two code-based cryptosystems to any Galois ring Z p s for any prime p and s ∈ N. The main thing that changes is the systematic form of the generator and parity check matrix of the code. In general, a linear code over Z p s has a (column p s−1 × · · · × Z ks p . If our code has length n, an information set is a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size i k i such that |C I | = |C|. The parity check matrix in (permuted) systematic form is in analog block echelon form (from the right) as the generator matrix above.
5.1.
Information set decoding over Z p s . One can set up an ISD algorithm analogously to Algorithm 2. Instead of two conditions on e 1 and e 2 we then get s + 1 conditions, where e 2 is chosen in order to to satisfy the second condition and having disjoint support from e 1 . On the other hand, in order that e 1 satisfies the remaining s conditions one needs to compute similar sets S and T and check for s collision.
Larger values of s and larger values of p will increase the complexity of the algorithm.
5.2.
Code-based cryptosystems over Z p s . The Niederreiter system can be used as it is over any Z p s . In the McEliece cryptosystem one just needs to make sure that the scrambling matrix on the left has the correct block diagonal structure to prevent mixing the subcodes that live in different subrings. The rest stays the same.
Since larger values of s and larger values of p will increase the complexity of the ISD algorithm, they will reduce the theoretical key size needed for a given security level.
Conclusion
In this section we want to conclude this paper and state some open questions and problems, which could be interesting.
The change from the Hamming metric to the rank metric has recently received a lot of attention in the code-based cryptography community, since the key sizes are very promising. Following this idea, we propose the change to the Lee metric and the ring-linear codes related to this metric. In this paper we built the framework for the use of quaternary codes in code-based cryptography by generalizing Stern's ISD algorithm to Z 4 . This paper also gives the general form of the quaternary version of the McEliece and the Niederreiter cryptosystem.
Here we provide some questions, which might lead to interesting applications and further understanding of ring-linear codes and the Lee-metric in a cryptographic point of view. Even though we restricted the focus in this paper on the case Z 4 , and explained shortly how to generalize this to Z p s , it is possible and it might be interesting to generalize this to Z m , for any m. It is possible that some of the ISD algorithms have a structure that correlates better to the Lee metric, hence there might be other ISD algorithms which should be generalized to Z 4 . And the most important question in order to have an application in cryptography is: which codes might be used for the quaternary version of the McEliece cryptosystem, such that the conditions for the cryptosystem are satisfied and the key size is reasonable?
